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Crises, Congress, and Cognitive Biases:
A Critical Examination of Food and Drug Legislation
in the United States
SHARON B. JACOBS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite recent criticism, it is generally acknowledged that the United States has one
of the world's most effective systems of food and drug regulation. Our system is of
relatively recent vintage-the first comprehensive federal food and drug legislation was
not passed until 1906-and was by no means born fully formed. Like most regulatory
programs, it grew to accommodate new discoveries and changing priorities.
When the first pieces of federal food and drug legislation passed in the early 1900s,
the most pressing concerns related to the proliferation of "filled" food products and
ineffective medications. Today, some of the primary threats come from tainted over-
seas imports and new blockbuster medications with subtle yet dangerous side effects.
Over the last century, food and drug law has evolved to encompass such concerns. But
that evolution has taken the form of a series of fits and starts rather than a smooth
and carefully planned expansion.
In 1992, then-Professor of Administrative Law Stephen Breyer published Break-
ing the Vicious Circle, a criticism of the way the United States regulates risk.' Breyer
described the method by which regulatory problems are identified and addressed as a
feedback loop whose ultimate result is to undermine the effectiveness of the regulatory
process. The first step in this loop is public perception of risk, which Breyer argued
is often irrational but nevertheless unfailingly produces a Congressional reaction. In
the second step, Congress responds to public fears, often by enacting statutes that
overemphasize the extent of the problem and impose overly-detailed requirements on
the government agencies that must address it. The final step concerns agency regula-
tion under these statutory mandates. Scientific uncertainty surrounding risk estimates
creates an inevitable gray area in which agencies exercise discretion that is supposedly
grounded in topical expertise. In reality, however, the limits of scientific knowledge
mean that agencies are highly susceptible to political influence. The resulting process,
Breyer concluded, produces risk determinations that are a hodgepodge of "science,
fact, value, and administration" and lead to both overregulation and arbitrary and
uncoordinated agenda-setting.2
Breyer focused on the third step in this process, proposing regulatory reforms to
improve the evaluation and comparison of risks at the agency level. This article, by
contrast, will emphasize the conjunction of the first two steps: public perception and
congressional reaction. In particular, it will focus on distortions that may occur when a
public outcry is triggered by a highly visible safety event. Its aim is to elaborate on the
mechanism by which risk events influence the public psyche, and how that influence
" Ms. Jacobs received her J.D. in 2009 from Harvard Law School and is a first year Associate at
Covington & Burling LLC. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and in no way
represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, Covington & Burling LLC.
' STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION
(1993).
2 Id. at 51.
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creates the impetus for legislation. It chronicles a pattern of such "crisis legislation"
in the evolution of food and drug law, from the 1902 Biologics Control Act to the
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA).
The phenomenon of crisis legislation is by no means confined to food and drug
law. In 1936, John B. Andrews wrote despairingly that even meritorious labor legisla-
tion tended to "languish for years in legislative halls until some dramatic event-a
factory fire, a mine catastrophe, the sinking of an ocean liner-spurred the public
and their representatives to insist upon protective legislation."3 More recently,
the 9/11 attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. initiated a legislative
scramble that resulted in the passage, scarcely more than a month after the planes
hit the twin towers, of the USA PATRIOT Act, a voluminous piece of legislation
that vastly expanded the executive branch's law enforcement capabilities.4 The cur-
rent economic crisis also produced a rapid legislative response. In September of
last year, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi called for a speedy legislative reply to the
financial crisis, noting that in "a less urgent situation, we could take all the time
in the world, to have an academic discussion of many possibilities. But right now,
as I have said before, time is of the essence."5 The Emergency Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act of 2008, which provided $700 billion dollars to the federal government to
purchase troubled mortgage-related assets and provide banks with cash infusions
was passed, less than a month after the financial crisis became front page news.
6
What is remarkable about the history of food and drug legislation in the United
States, however, and what makes it an appropriate subject for this inquiry, is the
sheer number of key statutes that have been passed in the wake of highly publicized
safety crises. It therefore provides fertile ground for the study of Breyer's hypothesis
about the potential pathologies of risk legislation and regulation.
The article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a historical overview of promi-
nent food and drug laws enacted this century and posits that their passage was
precipitated by highly-publicized calamities. Part II elaborates on the mechanics
of Breyer's "vicious circle," while Part III proposes several additional models that
might explain the Congressional behavior described in the case studies. The last
Part offers some modest suggestions toward ensuring that legislative responses to
crises are as thoughtful and well-tailored as possible, even while concluding that
crisis legislation is here to stay.
H. CASE STUDIES
This section provides a brief history of key food and drug laws, tracing their
connection to calamities in the last century. Crisis is not the sole factor motivating
food and drug legislation, even in the cases examined below. Dissatisfaction with
earlier legislation, interest group pressures, and personal legislative agendas, for
example, also play a part. This article's findings do suggest, however, that crises
can play a significant role in focusing public and congressional attention on the
need for reform in the face of competing priorities. As in the passage of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 and the Drug Amendments of 1962, crises
3 John B. Andrews, The Tragedy of Silicosis, 26 Am. Lab. Legis. Rev. 3, 3 (1936).
1 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
Many of the Act's provisions have since been held unconstitutional.
' Pelosi Remarks After White House Meeting on Crisis in Financial Markets, Sept. 25, 2008,
available at http://speaker.house.gov/newsroom/pressreleases?id=0841.
6 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-374, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
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may provide the triggers necessary to overcome legislative inertia and to move bills
that languish in the halls of Congress. Or, as in the case of the 1906 Pure Food
and Drug Act or the food and drug safety provisions of FDAAA, they may be the
impetus for the drafting of new legislation.
A. Early Regulation
Congressman Hendrick B. Wright introduced the first comprehensive federal
food purity legislation in 1879 in response to new information about the adultera-
tion of butter, margarine, alcohol, and coffee.7 Due primarily to the strength of
industry interests, however, no pure food bill was approved by either house of
Congress during the 1800s.8
Shortly after the turn of the century, the deaths of children from contaminated
vaccines provided the impetus for the passage of the Biologics Control Act of 1902.
In one incident, several children died in St. Louis as a result of contaminated diph-
theria antitoxin.' In another case, nine children died in Camden, New Jersey, after
being inoculated with smallpox vaccine.10 Newspapers across the nation carried
the stories.I' One opinion piece written shortly after the outbreak concluded that
"the public ought to be as careful about where its anti-toxin comes from as about
where its milk and water come from.' 1 2 A New York Times editorial went further,
condemning federal legislators for failing to address vaccine safety and urging swift
action to fill the breach.'3 Congress responded with the Biologics Control Act, which
required federal licensing of all biological products sold in the United States. and
of all biologics manufacturing establishments. It also gave the federal government
heightened inspection authority, as well as the power to punish violations of the
Act by fines or imprisonment. 4
It would be nearly three decades, however, before the passage of the first com-
prehensive federal food and drug legislation, the Food and Drugs Act of 1906.
The final passage of that Act after years of debate was due to a combination of
factors, including the long-time dedication of Harvey W Wiley, chief chemist at
the Department of Agriculture. However, it is often noted that the publication and
popularity of The Jungle, by Upton Sinclair, detailing the scandalous practices
of America's meat packing industry, led to the public outrage which jolted the
legislature into action.'"
I See PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL, AND LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 9 (3d ed. 2007); ARTI BHATIA, ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF HEALTH AND NUTRITION
86(1938).
8 James Harvey Young, The Long Struggle for the 1906 Law, in MEREDITH A. HICKMANN ED.,
THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (FDA) 19 (2003).
9 Held Responsible, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 19, 1901, at 3.
10 Later studies on rats revealed that the Camden vaccine was in fact tetanus-free, and that the
infections likely occurred as a result of improper care of the inoculation site. Camden's Lockjaw Epi-
demic, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 21, 1901, 1.
" See, e.g., Experiments with Vaccination, OREGONIAN (Portland), Nov. 21, 1901, at4; White Ra[t]s
Experiment: No Symptoms Have Developed After 72 Hours, COLUMBUS DAILY ENQUIRER (Columbus,
GA), Nov. 22, 1901, at 6; Two More Deaths After Vaccination, Tuscon Daily Citizen, Nov. 23, 1901,
at 1; Tetanus Claims Nine Victims in New Jersey, IDAHO STATESMAN, Nov. 28, 1901, at 2.
12 Anti-Toxins for Anti-Toxins, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Nov. 6, 1901, at 4.
13 Commercial Virus and Antitoxin, N.Y TIMES, Nov 19., 1901, at 6.
14 Act of July 1, 1902 (Biologics Control Act), Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728.
"S See, eg, HUTrr et al., supra note 7, at 10 ("Upton Sinclair... will forever be remembered
as the person who galvanized Congress and the country to bring federal food and drug legislation to
fruition after 27 years of consideration.").
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B. The 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
The annual Food and Drug Administration (FDA) report in 1933, noted that the
1906 Federal Food and Drugs Act, then over a quarter of a century old, suffered
from serious defects. For one thing, the Act did not cover cosmetics. Language
including cosmetics was dropped from the bill in response to industry pressure, and
while the absence of regulation for cosmetics did not seem unduly problematic at
the time, growth in the cosmetics industry after 1906 made regulation desirable. 6
Also missing from the Act was authority to define legal standards for food or to
inspect warehouses. Furthermore, the definition of a "drug" was overly narrow,
making it difficult to regulate medical devices and purported dietary remedies. 7 For
those drugs that were covered, purely misleading statements went unregulated-the
Act governed only "false and fraudulent" statements about drugs found on their
packaging material. 8
The Secretary of Agriculture, who was originally tasked with enforcement of the
1906 Act, and the FDA, when it took over the Act's enforcement in 1927, called
repeatedly for new legislation to address the law's shortcomings. It was not until
1933, however, that the Senate finally took up a bill to revise the 1906 Act. 9
The Department of Agriculture drafted the first version of the bill. It was intro-
duced on June 12, 1933 by Senator Royal S. Copeland of New York, a physician
and former Health Commissioner of New York City2 0 The bill brought cosmetics
and medical devices within the FDA's ambit. It also prohibited false advertising
of food, drugs, and cosmetics, supplemented labeling requirements and imposed
stricter controls on false labeling and new controls on advertising.
21
The FDA, no doubt cognizant of the persuasive power of tragedy, cited several
instances of consumer injury in support of the new legislation. These examples,
including "Koremlu Cream," a depilatory containing poisonous thallium acetate
that caused severe injury to users, Marmola, a risky "slenderizing" compound,
and "Radithor," a radium solution that caused a high-profile death, 22 were almost
certainly included to communicate a sense of urgency to the legislature.
The extensive changes proposed by the first bill met with violent opposition,
especially from affected industry. In January of 1934, Senator Copeland replaced
it with a second draft,23 which died in the Senate Committee on Commerce after
16 CHARLES 0. JACKSON, FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION IN THE NEW DEAL 4 (1970).
17 ARTHUR PHILIP GREELEY, THE FOOD AND DRUGS ACT, JUNE 30, 1906: A STUDY WITH TEXT OF
THE ACT, ANNOTATED, Chapter III § 23 (1907). While noting that the term "drug" is to be given "the
broadest possible meaning," the Act gives as examples of a drug pharmaceutical preparations, plasters,
salves, ointments, and medicinal soap, failing to list any product analogous to a medical device or dietary
remedy. Id.
" See James M. Best, Significance of the Proposed Moore Amendment, 4 Food Drug Cosm. L.Q.
71 (1949); see also CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: A STATEMENT
OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD 24-25 (1938) (citing a 1917 Bureau of Chemistry report).
"9 SEE CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: A STATEMENT OF ITS
LEGISLATIVE RECORD 25 (1938).
20 See id. According to James Harvey Young, Senator Copeland did not even read the draft bill,
which he introduced during an emergency session of Congress on June 12, 1933. JAMES HARVEY YOUNG,
THE MEDICAL MESSIAHS 164 (1967). Rexford G. Tugwell, the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, had
urged that the hastily drafted bill be as tough as possible so that its proponents would have more provi-
sions to concede in the inevitable negotiations with industry. JACKSON, supra note 17, at 27, 34 (citing
an interview with Rexford Tugwell, June 7, 1968).
21 See CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: A STATEMENT OF ITS
LEGISLATIVE RECORD 25-26 (1938).
22 Id at 26-27.
23 Id. at 51-52.
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several hearings. 24 When introducing a third draft in February of 1934, Senator
Copeland noted that he "thought [he] had had all the troubles one could in this
life," but that he had never "had so many worries and so much trouble" as in con-
nection with the earlier versions of the bill." The new draft created various advisory
boards made up of interest group representatives in order to disperse some of the
power previously concentrated in the Secretary of Agriculture 6.2 It also removed the
requirement that manufacturers list formularies on proprietary drug labels, limited
a publisher's liability for accepting false advertisements, and eliminated the idea of
establishing multiple quality grades for food products.27 The bill was reported out
of committee on March 15, 1934,28 but the full Congress adjourned without taking
further action.29 In its 1934 annual report, the FDA predicted that the debate had
''aroused public interest in the purity of the food and drug supply," which would
''unmistakably grow into a united demand for effective legislation which cannot be
gainsaid. ' 3° Despite the agency's optimism, it would be another four years before
the public's interest would be sufficiently aroused to spur passage of the legislation.
One author noted in late 1934 that "[a]ll is quiet on the public front . . .-3
On January 3, 1935, the newest incarnation of the bill was introduced in the
Senate and referred to committee.12 Again, the bill was not demonstrably different
from earlier versions, although it did make concessions to industry with respect
to proprietary drug labeling requirements and advertising restrictions. 33 The most
contentious issues in the new legislation were provisions governing seizure of
products that presented a health risk and whether the FDA or the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) should be responsible for enforcement of advertising require-
ments.Y A conference committee reached a compromise that passed the Senate.
However, as a result of the disagreement over FDA and FTC jurisdiction, as well
as public apathy, the bill died in the House."
Reasons for the delay in enacting the food and drug bill were myriad. Internal
congressional disagreement about the proper scope of the legislation was certainly
one factor. Also, as noted above, industry lobbyists were strongly opposed to the
bill. President Roosevelt, who supported the bill but gave it relatively low legisla-
tive priority, wrote in 1933 that he hoped "we can get it through in spite of the
lobbies."36 But the country was in the throes of the Great Depression, and both
Roosevelt and Congress had more immediate concerns.
24 Id. at 67.
25 congressional record, House, Feb. 19, 1934, at 2728.
26 See DUNN, supra note 21, at 68-69.
27 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 51.
26 DUNN, supra note 21, at 92.
29 Id. at 190.
30 Id.
31 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 55 (citing Robert Swain, Drug Topics, 4 FDA Scrapbooks, Dec. 10,
1934). In a 1938 article, David F. Cavers, an advisor to the USDA on food and drug administration
from 1933-34, lamented the fact that the Act "never became the object of widespread public attention,
much less of informed public interest." Cavers blamed both the national press and President Roosevelt
for failing to bring the Act to the public's attention. David E Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 Law and Contemporary Problems
2, 3 (1938).
32 DUNN, supra note 21, at 191.
3 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 76.
1 DUtN, supra note 21, at 598.
31 Id. at 633; see also JACKSON, supra note 16, at 84-85.
36 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 27 (citing correspondence between Roosevelt and Harvey Cushing,
April 21, 1933, at 375, Roosevelt Papers).
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In an effort to counter popular apathy and industry propaganda, the FDA pub-
lished a series of posters demonstrating the shortcomings of the 1906 law. These
posters, dubbed the "Chamber of Horrors," depicted dangerous products such as
Koremlu and Radiathor, along with information about those injured or killed as a
result of their use."7 The posters went on display at the Century of Progress Exposi-
tion in Chicago, were featured prominently in FDA offices around the country, and
were loaned out to organizations upon request.38 The posters generated widespread
attention, but failed to produce the kind of organized support required to secure
the bill's passage.39
Then, tragedy struck in the form of Elixir Sulfanilamide. In 1937, the Massen-
gill Company, a reputable pharmaceutical manufacturer in Tennessee, created a
new liquid version of sulfanilamide, a drug used to treat streptococcal infections,
by dissolving the drug in diethylene glycol. The solvent was later revealed to be a
deadly poison. The existing drug laws did not require safety testing, however, and
elixir sulfanilamide was not tested for toxicity before its release, even on animals. 40
The pink, raspberry-flavored drug was only screened for color, taste, and aroma.41
Even more remarkably, the company failed to perform even a cursory survey of
the scientific literature, which would have revealed diethylene glycol's toxicity.42
One month after elixir sulfanilamide's release, the American Medical Association
(AMA) began to receive reports of deaths linked to the drug's consumption, and
subsequent testing established conclusively the elixir's toxicity. On October 18 the
AMA released a nationwide warning via the press.
4
The FDA reacted relatively quickly, delegating nearly all of its 239 inspectors
to discover and retrieve all remaining prescriptions of elixir sulfanilamide, but not
before more than 100 people, mostly children, had died.' In all, fifteen states, from
Virginia to California, saw fatalities. 45 Due to the inadequacies of existing federal
law, all FDA seizures had to be premised on the trivial ground that the drug was
misbranded as an "elixir," when it should have been called a "solution" because it
contained no alcohol.
46
37 Id. at 44.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 44-45. A widespread poisoning incident also failed to generate broad public support for
the new legislation. This was the event know as the "Ginger Jake" incident, in which 25,000 people
across the country were poisoned by bootlegged alcoholic tonic. Hundreds died, and thousands more
were injured. See CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: A STATEMENT
OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD 949 (1938). Nevertheless, the floor debates on the new food and drug bill
contain few references to the incident. Possibly, this mass poisoning provided only moderate legislative
motivation because it involved the consumption of alcohol, and therefore those affected were seen as
less sympathetic than, for example, innocent children.
o Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident,
FDA website, http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/elixir.html.
1 Paul M. Wax, Elixirs, Diluents, and the Passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
122 Annals of Internal Medicine 456 (1995).
42 David F Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its
Substantive Provisions, 6 Law and Contemporary Problems 2, 10 (1938).
" CHARLES 0. JACKSON, FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION IN THE NEW DEAL 154 (1970).
44 Ballentine, supra note 40, at 1; Stephen Mihm, A Tragic Lesson, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 26,
2007.
41 JACKSON, supra note 43, at 159.
46 Ballentine, supra note 40. An interesting aside related to the elixir sulfanilamide tragedy is
that the FDA used the tragedy to study variations in the doses that killed humans. This study led to
the development of the 100-fold safety factor still in use today in determining safe drug dosage levels.
Peter Barton Hutt, The 1940s: Initial Implementation of the New Statute, 45 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 21,
28 (1990).
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The media did its part to ensure that the incident received broad national at-
tention. Time Magazine quoted an FDA agent's description of Massengill as a
facility in which "they just throw drugs together, and if they don't explode they are
placed on sale."47 Time also noted pointedly that if the Pure Food & Drug bill had
passed during the last Congressional session, Massengill would have been subject
to criminal prosecution. Under existing law, Massengill was convicted solely of
product misbranding and was fined $26,000.48
In January of 1938, the General Bulletin of Consumers' Research expressed
hope that "at last the public will demand of Congress that [a new law] be passed
that these more than ninety innocent victims... shall not have died in vain. 49 The
Chicago Daily Tribune seized on a study by the AMA and published the following
headline: "Food-Drug Laws Blamed by A.M.A. in Elixir Deaths."' 0 Such reports
captured the prevailing sentiment that the government was partially responsible
for the elixir sulfanilamide deaths by virtue of its failure to enact new legislation
that might have prevented the tragedy.
Legislators began to feel pressure from their constituents. James Harvey Young,
writing in 1964, opined that the legislation finally succeeded only because of the
"upsurges of public pressure felt in Congress" as a result of the elixir sulfanil-
amide tragedy.5 The impact may have been particularly great when such missives
reached staunch opponents of new legislation, one of whom "found his mail heavy
with demands for a new law 'so as to make impossible a repetition of the recent
Sulfanilamide tragedy."' 52 New regulation would help industry, too, by helping to
restore public confidence. One author put it rather poetically when he wrote that,
"[t]he dramatic headlines gave politicians the impetus they needed to finally pass
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938" which had "flopped weakly around
the Capitol for four years like a fish on the deck of a sailboat.
5 3
Senator Copeland confirmed these intuitions when, in November 16, 1937, he
introduced the following resolution in the Senate:
Whereas the Nation has been startled recently by published and broadcast
reports of scores of deaths of its citizens, ascribed to the administration of
a drug known as elixir of sulfanilamide shipped in interstate commerce;
and Whereas such reports have caused widespread editorial comment
that such tragedies can be prevented by adequate revision of the Food
and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906 ... Therefore be it Resolved, That the
[USDA] is requested to transmit to the Senate, not later than November
25, 1937, a full report of the facts concerning such deaths, together with
recommendations for any needed legislation on the subject.
5 4
47 Fatal Remedy, TIME, Nov 1, 1937, 61, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ar-
ticle/0,9171,882914,00.html.
48 JACKSON, supra note 43, at 161.
41 Id, at 151.
10 Food-Drug Laws Blamed by A.M.A. in Elixir Deaths, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE, Nov. 3, 1937,
at 17.
51 JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, THE MEDICAL MESSIAHS 199 (1967).
52 JACKSON, supra note 45, at 163 (citing letter from Mecklenburg Medical Association to Bailey,
March 20, 1938, Bailey Papers).
53 FRAN HAWTHORNE, INSIDE THE FDA: THE BUSINESS AND POLITICS BEHIND THE DRUGS WE TAKE
AND THE FOOD WE EAT 42 (2005).
4 See CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: A STATEMENT OF ITS
LEGISLATIVE RECORD 1016-1017 (1938).
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The House passed a similar resolution two days later. Representative Virgil Chap-
man noted the "grave importance" of the matter, and pressed his colleagues not to
delay in adopting the resolution.5 Representative Edward Rees made the following
appeal, which embodied the prevailing desire among members of Congress to be
seen as heroes rather than delinquents so accurately that it has been reproduced
with few omissions:
We talk about emergency measures. This is a measure which can well
come under that classification. If there ever was need for legislation on
food and drugs for this country, that time is right now. Newspapers and
periodicals are crowded with information and of incidents where individu-
als and companies have taken advantage of people by the hundreds and
the thousands, by falsification of advertising and adulteration as well as
misbranding of foods and medicines.
To bring the problem closer home, we have the horrible example which oc-
curred only a few weeks ago, when a concern in Tennessee was permitted to
sell a drug known as elixir of sulfanilamide that has resulted in not only the
illness of numbers of people but, according to the information received from
the pure food and drug department, at least 73 innocent people have died
from using this misbranded and misrepresented drug... During the last 4
years bills have been pending before Congress which have provided for the
constructive amendment and enforcement of the pure food and drug law,
but in each and every case these bills have either been killed in the committee
or amended in such a way that they became ineffective...
It seems to me that it is high time this Congress, instead of giving consid-
eration to the question of the loaning of portraits to a picture gallery, or
other trifling matters, should get down to business and give consideration
to the problems that are of vital importance to the health, the welfare, and
the happiness of the people of this country.
5 6
After receiving the USDA's report, Senator Copeland introduced a new piece of
legislation on December 1, 1937 which became known as the "sulfanilamide bill".
The bill required, for the first time, proof of safety before a drug could be distrib-
uted. It prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of any drug composed, in
whole or in part, of any substance not generally recognized as safe for use under the
conditions prescribed or suggested in its labeling. Packers of these drugs would be
required to submit full reports of the investigations conducted to demonstrate the
drug's safety, a list of all the drug's components, a description of the manufactur-
ing, processing, and packing of the drug, and samples of the drug and its proposed
label. In a long-absent showing of expediency, the Senate Commerce Committee
reported the bill without hearings, amendment, or a written report, on February
9, 1938.17 On May 5, the Senate passed the bill unanimously, without amendment,
and with almost no debate. 
8
5 Id. at 1024-25.
Congressional record, House, Nov. 24, 1937, at 355-56 (statement of Representative Rees).
17 Id. at 1019-1020.
58 Id.
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Finally, after five years of legislative meandering, Congress enacted what became
known as the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). President Roosevelt
signed the Act into law on June 25, 1938.19 The final version of the Act required
that all drug companies submit a new drug application to FDA demonstrating drug
safety before distributing any drug in interstate commerce.60 Other provisions of the
bill gave FDA the authority to inspect production facilities, allowed federal courts
to issue injunctions to prevent violations of the Act, allowed false drug claims to
be enjoined without proof of fraud, and required drug labels to include directions
for use and to contain warnings of any special characteristics or hazards associated
with use.61 In addition, FDA was finally given authority to regulate cosmetics. 62
The story of the FDCA is not atypical. A certain amount of its delay was le-
gitimate: most agree that the first draft of the bill was far from ideal. Some of the
extensive discussions in committee and on the floors of the House and Senate were
fruitful, some less so (one Senator was concerned that eyelash and eyebrow dyes
were being treated differently from hair dyes, for example).63 The inadequacies of
the bill's first draft, however, cannot fully explain why such an important piece of
legislation, generally known and acknowledged to be necessary to remedy danger-
ous gaps in the 1906 Act, was allowed to languish in Congress for over five years,
or why a national emergency was necessary to generate the political will that led
to its passage. Daniel Carpenter and Gisela Sin suggest, in a paper delivered to the
RJW Health Policy Workshop at Yale University in 2002, that elixir sulfanilamide's
regional impact played a crucial role.6 They note that deaths from the drug were
concentrated in the South and the lower Midwest, areas in which political opposi-
tion to new federal legislation was strong.
6
Ultimately, the tremendous exertion required to move this legislation took its
toll on the bill's champion. Four days after the bill was enacted into law, its tireless
sponsor, Senator Copeland, died.
C. The 1962 Drug Amendments
The 1962 Drug Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
grew out of a series of drug investigations conducted by Tennessee Senator Estes
Kefauver's Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judi-
ciary.66 The original purpose of the legislation, introduced in April of 1961 as the
"Drug Industry Antitrust Act" by Senator Kefauver, was to amend the antitrust
laws with respect to the manufacture and distribution of drugs in order to reduce
19 Id. at 1015.
60 Paul M. Wax, Elixirs, Diluents, and the Passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
122 Annals of Internal Medicine 456 (1995).
61 Barry S. Robert & David Z. Bodenheimer, Drug Amendments of 1962: The Anatomy of a
Regulatory Failure, 1982 Ariz. St. L.J. 581, 583 (1982).
62 David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its
Substantive Provisions, 6 Law and Contemporary Problems 2, 40-41 (1938).
63 See CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: A STATEMENT OF ITS
LEGISLATIVE RECORD 723 (1938).
64 Daniel Carpenter and Gisela Sin, Crisis and the Emergency of Economic Regulation: The
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, available at http:/people.
hmdc.harvard.edu/-dcarpent/crisisl938.pdf.)
65 Id. at 3.
6 Senate Report No. 1744 on the Drug Industry Act of 1962, 871h Congress, 2d Session, Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, July 19, 1962, at 11.
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the cost of patented and other prescription medication." The antitrust angle
had strong support from President Kennedy, as evidenced by a letter he wrote to
Senator James Eastland early in 1962 emphasizing the need to protect consumer
interests by ensuring competitive pricing.6" However, many in the Senate opposed
what they saw as the anti-free enterprise focus of the bill. As Senator John Carroll
noted in June of 1962, the legislation was "highly controversial" and plagued by
infighting.68 In a covert meeting held in early June 1962 without the knowledge of
Senator Kefauver, Judiciary Committee staff worked out a compromise measure
that emasculated the licensing and antitrust provisions in the original bill.70
On July 19, 1962, the Judiciary Committee reported out the "Drug Industry Act
of 1962." The legislation's new purpose, as stated by the committee report, was
to "bring about better, safer medicine and to establish a more effective system of
enforcement of the drug laws."'" The bill no longer insisted, for instance, on com-
pulsory patent licensing for all who sought it after three years of patent exclusivity.
Instead, it focused nearly entirely on drug safety and effectiveness. The bill required
drug manufacturing and processing facilities to register with the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (the predecessor to today's Department of Health
and Human Services). It strengthened FDA's inspection authority and required
drugs that did not conform to good manufacturing practices to be labeled "adul-
terated." Most notably, it required that new drugs be both safe and effective.7 The
only remaining measure that impacted competition was a requirement that drugs
be labeled with the generic name of their active ingredient in order to facilitate
competition.7 4 The impact of this last measure would be limited, however, accord-
ing to Senator Kefauver, because it duplicated existing regulations. 5
As Congress pondered the new drug amendments, a crisis was unfolding in Eu-
rope. That crisis, triggered by the approval and widespread use of thalidomide in
pregnant women, created shockwaves felt across the Atlantic.76 A small German
company named Greunenthal developed thalidomide while searching for a new
antibiotic. While the new drug disappointed as an antibiotic, the firm remarked on
its sedative properties and began to market it for a variety of purposes. The drug
became a blockbuster." Thalidomide-based compounds were used as sleep aids,
sedatives, as well as to treat nervousness, coughs, colds, and even asthma. Crucially,
67 Congressional Record, Senate, Apr. 12, 1961, 5368 (statement of Senator Kefauver).
68 Letter from President John F Kennedy to Senator James 0. Eastland, April 10, 1962, as printed
in Congressional Record, Senate, June 11 1962, at 10105. In this letter, the President also suggesting
several amendments on ensuring drug safety. Id.
69 Congressional Record, Senate, June 11, 1962, Statement of Senator Carroll, at 10110.
70 Congressional Record, Senate, June 11, 1962, Statements of Senators Kefauver and Eastland,
at 10106-07.
71 SEN. REP. No. 87-1744 at 8. As Senator Kenneth Keating noted later in the summer, it seemed
odd that the Judiciary Committee should be primarily responsible for the bill after the anti-trust provi-
sions had been eliminated, given that food and drug administration measures were ordinarily assigned
to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Works. Congressional Record, Senate, Aug. 23, 1962,
at 16317 (statement of Senator Keating).
7 SEN. REP. No. 87-1744 at 9, 12.
I3 d. at 8- 10.
74 Id. at 17-18.
I d. at 34.
76 See Julie A. Grow, The Legislative History of the 1962 Drug Amendments: A Failure to Forget
or a Lesson to Learn From? 54 (May 1, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://leda.law.
harvard.edu/leda/data/I 89/jgrow.rtf).
77 Gina Bari Kolata, The Thalidomide Tragedy: Was it Preventable?, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1979,
at D7.
VOL. 6 4
2009 FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
thalidomide was also given to pregnant women to combat nausea.78 Gruenenthal
marketed the drug as completely safe. However, reports were made of neurological
side effects, including tingling in the extremities and loss of sensation. Despite these
observations, European marketing of the drug continued.79
The discrepancy between the results of animal studies, which showed no ill
effects, and the observed effects in humans caught the attention of Dr. Frances
Kelsey, the FDA physician responsible for granting approval of thalidomide in
the United States. Thanks to the foresight of Dr. Kelsey, thalidomide was never
approved in this country. However, the Richardson-Merrell company, which
partnered with Gruenenthal and attempted to secure approval to market tha-
lidomide in the United States under the name "Kevadon," distributed the drug
to physicians without engaging in any prior testing to ensure the drug's safety.8
In all, over 2.5 million tablets were distributed to more than 1,000 physicians,
and then to patients as part of the investigational program before those trials
were stopped in 1962.81
In 1961, alarming reports began to circulate of a significant increase in birth
defects linked to mothers' use of thalidomide in Europe. These "thalidomide babies"
were born either without limbs or with flipper-like appendages as well as brain
damage.8 2 Dr. Helen Taussig, a Professor of Pediatrics at Johns Hopkins University,
went on a six week fact-finding trip to England and Germany to determine the
magnitude of the crisis. Upon her return, she held a press conference, reporting
on the widespread instances of deformities and asserting that "this compound,
Thalidomide, could have passed our present drug laws."83
While Dr. Taussig's speeches received limited attention at first, Senator Kefauver's
secretary brought one of them to the Senator's attention in the summer of 1962.
Senator Kefauver speculated that publicizing Dr. Taussig's findings would help spur
passage of his legislation.8 4 One member of his staff, Dr. John Blair, is reported
to have remarked that "the thalidomide story, or something like it, is just what we
need to ram [the legislation] through."85 Kefauver convinced a reporter from the
Washington Post to interview Dr. Kelsey about the near-approval of thalidomide
78 Max Sherman & Steven Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41 Food Drug
Cosm. L.J. 458, 460 (1986).
19 See Howard B. Yeon, Thalidomide Revisited 7 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/search/tc.php3?handle=HLS.Library.Leda/yeonhb-thalidomide-re-
visited).
8o See Kristina E. Lutz, From Tragedy to Triumph: The Approval of Thalidomide 4 (May 1, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/search/toc.php3?handle=HLS.
Library. Leda/lutzke-tragedy-triumph-approval).
1I Thalidomide, 77 Public Health Reports 946 (1962).
82 See ELISABETH A. CAWTHOM, MEDICINE ON TRIAL 46 (2004).
83 Robert K. Plumb, Deformed Babies Traced to a Drug: 'Harmless' Tablet Given to Mothers
Abroad is Cited as Infants' Crippler," N.Y TIMES, Apr. 11, 1962 at 37. "There is no question," Dr.
Taussig continued, "that we must strengthen our food and drug regulations to include routine testing
of new compounds on pregnant animals." Id. In retrospect, however, testing on animals alone may not
have prevented the drug's approval in this case. Australian Physician William McBride, widely credited
with being among the first to alert the public to the dangers of thalidomide, was unable to identify
similar effects on newborns in mice and guinea pigs. See KRISTINA E. Lurz, FROM TRAGEDY TO TRIUMPH:
THE APPROVAL OF THALIDOMIDE 4 (May 1, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, available at http:/lfeda.law.
harvard.edu/leda/search/toc.php3?handle=HLS.Library.Leda/utzke-tragedy-triumph-apprva). But
see note 92, infra, citing reports of abnormalities from studies performed on pregnant rabbits.
8 Lisa A. Seidman & Noreen Warren, Frances Kelsey & Thalidomide in the US.. A Case Study
Relating to Pharmaceutical Regulation, 64 The American Biology Teacher 495, 499 (2002).
85 RICHARD HARRIS, THE REAL VOICE 161 (1964).
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in this country16 The resulting front page story triggered a tidal wave of nation-
wide media coverage.8 7 Dr. Kelsey's face appeared above the fold on newspapers
across the country. She became an unlikely national hero; one newspaper article
dubbed her a "quietly heroic bureaucrat."8 Her story even piqued the interest of
President Kennedy, who subsequently called for the passage of stronger food and
drug legislation, noting that a possible national tragedy had been averted thanks
only to the "skeptical FDA physician." 9
After the thalidomide story broke, the Judiciary Committee turned with renewed
interest to the food and drug bill.9° Senator Kefauver recognized that this momentum
could carry the bill through to passage, and his rhetoric began to reflect a sense
of urgency. The following is a sample of statements he made on the floor late in
the summer of 1962:
"The experience with thalidomide only points up the problem in a very
dramatic way. Other drugs have not been sufficiently tested ... Unlike
thalidomide, which by a series of fortuitous events, was kept off the market,
these products did reach the market and then, after the American people
had served as guinea pigs, had to be withdrawn .... The tragedy involv-
ing thalidomide, horrible though it is, has served the useful purpose of
dramatizing some of the abuses in the drug industry and has underscored
the urgent need for laws to insure that drugs like thalidomide never get to
the American public.., if we do not write effective legislation--everyone
in this country, expectant mothers included, will be courting tragedy with
every trip to the medicine cabinet."'"
Senator Kefauver, along with Senators John Carroll, Phillip Hart, and Thomas
Dodd, proposed an amendment that would give the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare explicit authority to require animal testing of new drugs before
those drugs were approved. 92 During meetings to consider the amendments, tem-
pers ran high, with Jerome Sonosky, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislation
at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, accusing Senator Roman
86 Morton Mintz, 'Heroine' of FDA Keeps Bad Drug Off of Market, WASH. POST, July 15, 1962,
at Al.
" See, e.g, Doctor Rejects Drug. U S. Babies Spared, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 6, 1962, at 1; Morton
Mintz, Great Tragedy Avertedby Woman's Skepticism, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1962, at 10; Doctor's Action
Bars Birth Defects, N.Y TIMES, July 16, 1962, at 23.
88 Jack Anderson, Jury Calls for Thalidomide Files, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1962, at B11.
19 John M. Goshko, FDA Awaits Results on Thalidomide Check, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1962, at
A4.
go Congressional Record, Senate, Aug. 23, 1962, at 16303 (statement of Senator Eastland).
9' Congressional Record, Senate, Aug. 3, 1962, at 14515 (statement of Senator Kefauver). Sena-
tor Kefauver also highlighted the story of MER/29 to persuade his fellow lawmakers that reform was
necessary. In 1959, the FDA approved MER/29, manufactured by the same company that produced
thalidomide in the United States. The drug was subsequently withdrawn by the manufacturer after
reports of adverse side effects, and newspapers reported that the company had failed to submit sufficient
data to FDA in its new drug application. PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 124 (1980). Senator Kefauver capitalized on the (admittedly minor) stir, drawing
attention on the Senate Floor to "Mer-29, put out by... Merrell, [which] caused cataracts, and was
taken off the market." Congressional Record, Senate, Aug. 3, 1962, at 14515 (statement of Senator
Kefauver).
92 Congressional Record, Senate, Aug. 6, 1962, at 14683 (letter from Senator Kefauver to Senators
Carroll, Hart, Dodd, and Long, July 31, 1962). While testing of thalidomide in rats had produced no
malformations, testing on rabbits performed in Great Britain yielded conclusive results of deformity
in their litters. Id
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Hruska of not caring about deformed babies.93 Ultimately, however, neither this
amendment nor several others offered by Senator Kefauver in an attempt to re-
suscitate the antitrust provisions of the original bill were adopted. Interestingly,
during this period, FDA reacted to the thalidomide crisis by adopting regulations
governing the testing of new drugs, including a regulation requiring animal testing
and standards governing the distribution of new drugs for investigational use, with
special care given to drugs tested for use on children or pregnant women. Many
were surprised to learn that FDA possessed sufficient authority under existing law
to enact these regulations.
94
Despite FDA's new rules, Congressional efforts continued. For the remainder of
the debate on the bill that was to become the 1962 Drug Amendments, references
to thalidomide and to the heroic efforts of Dr. Frances Kelsey were legion, and
every effort was made by the bill's supporters to keep the crisis fresh. On August 23,
Senator Carroll introduced into the record a news release from the FDA warning
that "[t]ablets of thalidomide ... are still at large in family medicine cabinets" as
the result of a failure on the part of some doctors to contact all patients to whom
they had distributed the medication. 95
The media also kept the pressure on. That month, the Chicago Tribune reported
that, after accusations of 'dragging its feet' on drug legislation, Congress was now
taking swift action "under pressure resulting from the discovery that thalidomide
taken by pregnant mothers can result in deformed babies."96 New hearings on the
bill took place in what a drug industry executive cautioned was an "emotionally
charged atmosphere." 97 Dr. Frances Kelsey was in attendance. 98
The bill passed unanimously in both houses of Congress and was signed into law
by President Kennedy on October 10, 1962. Immediately after the bill's passage in
the Senate, Senator Paul Douglas declared that Senator Kefauver had been vindi-
cated. "[B]ecause of the many terrible tragedies which have occurred in European
countries from the use of the drug thalidomide and the cases which have occurred
in this country," Senator Douglas remarked, "it has been proved that" Senator
Kefauver was right to take on the drug industry.9
The true magnitude of the thalidomide tragedy's effect on the passage of the 1962
Amendments has been debated. Senator Roman Hruska of Nebraska objected to
the notion that an occurrence such as the "near tragedy which threatened us in the
thalidomide case" was necessary before Congress would act to strengthen the drug
laws, pointing out that Senator Kefauver's bill was introduced long before news of
the thalidomide tragedy reached American shores. 00 Other legislators disagreed.
Senator Jacob Javits reflected during the summer debates on the bill that "what
has.., brought the bill to the point of passage.., is the great concern which was
sparked by the use of the drug thalidomide."'' That was certainly the impression
93 HARRIS, supra note 88, at 198.
' Id. at 200.
9 Congressional Record, Senate, Aug. 23, 1962, News Release from U.S. Dept. of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, Food and Drug Administration, at 16341-42.




99 Congressional Record, Senate, Aug. 23, 1962, at 16360 (statement of Senator Douglas). While
Senator Kefauver no doubt appreciated the praise, he may also have been slightly amused, given that
the original legislation's focus was drug pricing, not drug safety.
100 Congressional Record, Senate, Aug. 23, 1962, at 16317 (statement of Senator Keating).
"I Congressional Record, Senate, Aug. 23, 1962, at 16335 (statement of Senator Javits).
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conveyed by the media. 1 2 The Washington Post described the thalidomide incident's
contribution compellingly, if slightly indelicately: "Whatever its defects as a seda-
tive," the paper proclaimed, "thalidomide has shown itself a powerful stimulant
to legislative action."' It seems safe to conclude that, even if the bill's origins
admittedly lay elsewhere, the thalidomide crisis provided the impetus for decisive
Congressional action.
D. The Infant Formula Act of 1980
A more localized crisis unfolded in the summer of 1979. That August, the New
York Times reported that FDA was investigating dozens of cases of babies who
had become sick after consuming infant formula. The babies were diagnosed with
metabolic alkalosis, a rare condition accompanied by vomiting, diarrhea, high fever,
and, most worryingly, physical and mental growth retardation."'° The syndrome
was known to be caused by a deficiency of chloride, the less commonly-known half
of sodium-chloride, or table salt.
FDA swiftly determined that the infants' syndrome was the result of long-term,
exclusive use of chloride-deficient soy formulas. The illnesses could all be linked
to two soy products manufactured by the Palo Alto-based Syntex Corporation,
Neo-Mull-Soy and Cho-Free.'05 It later came to light that in 1978, Syntex had either
reduced or discontinued the addition of salt to these two formulas. The company's
motives were largely benevolent: it based the decision in part on studies showing
that hypertension and high blood pressure later in life were linked to high salt
intake.' 6 Unfortunately, this reformulation resulted in products that contained an
inadequate amount of chloride, an essential nutrient for growth and development in
infants. There was no FDA regulation governing levels of either sodium or chloride
in infant formula at the time, although existing regulations did list eight required
nutrients.'° If it had been detected earlier, the chloride deficiency might have been
dealt with under the agency's existing authority to declare a product misbranded, as
the labels of both soy formulas continued to represent that the product contained
higher levels of chloride than many tested batches were found to contain.'
Much of the credit for bringing the incident to public and Congressional at-
tention goes to Lea Thompson, now chief consumer correspondent for Dateline
NBC.19 In 1979, Thompson was a television news reporter for WBC, an NBC af-
filiate. She ran a series of broadcasts chronicling the unfolding story of infants who
developed brain damage from consuming the deficient formula. The controversy
caught the attention of a young representative from Tennessee, Albert Gore. Gore
102 In a characteristic linkage of the thalidomide crisis to the new legislation, the Chicago Tribune
reported on the night the Senate passed its version of the bill that the bill passed even "as the Food and
Drug administration warned that a substantial percentage of 2 /2 million tablets of a drug dangerous
to unborn infants may remain in medicine cabinets of American citizens." Willard Edwards, Senate
Votes Tighter Drug Control Bill, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 24, 1962, at 1.
"03 Thalidomide's Potency, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1962, at A8. "What a pity," the article continued,
"that it took the birth of armless children in Europe and Canada to provoke the Senate into doing what
it should have been doing on the merits!" Id.
04 Judith Cummings, FDA Checking Infant Formulas, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 1, 1979, at A 15.
0 Randal D. Shields, Food and Drug Law: The Infant Formula of 1980, 15 Akron L. Rev. 752,
753-54 (1982).
106 Id. at 756.
07 Gerald F. Seib, How Two Mothers Took on Bureaucracy in Fight to Toughen Infant-Formula
Rules, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1980, at 15.
108 See Toby Milgrom Levin, The Infant Formula Act of 1980: A Case Study of Congressional
Delegation to the Food and Drug Administration, 42 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 101, 108 (1982).
' Msnbc.com, Dateline NBC, Lea Thompson, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3949442/.
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organized hearings of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce to address the problem
and hold Syntex accountable."' Thompson was among those who testified. The
committee report recommended that new legislation be enacted to require testing
of infant formula before marketing and after any reformulation. III
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Infant Formula Act of 1980 by a nearly
unanimous vote, and President Jimmy Carter signed the bill into law on September
26, 1980.112 This law added section 412 to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act. The section requires that new standards, good manufacturing practices, and
quality controls be established for the production of infant formula. It establishes
that any formula failing to meet these standards will be considered an adulterated
food product within the meaning of the FDCA. I 3 FDA has implemented the Act's
requirements through regulations on recall procedures, quality control practices,
and labeling and nutrient requirements.' 14 Thus the controversy generated by a
relatively small outbreak resulted, in one year, in new legislation governing the
regulation of infant formula. 5
E. The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007
(FDAAA)
The refrain of crisis and response in food and drug legislation is not purely
a thing of the past. This section will examine the history of the Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), passed unanimously in the
Senate and by a vote of 405-7 in the House and signed by President George W
Bush on September 27, 2007.
The Act had five major components, the first three of which will be mentioned
only briefly. First, it reauthorized the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA). I6
Second, it reauthorized the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act"7 as well as the
Pediatric Research Equity Act." 8 It also created a new research incentives program
for pediatric medical devices. " 9 Third, the Act contained new requirements for clinical
I' Infant Formula Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 961h Cong., Is Sess. (1979) (cited in Shields, supra note
107, at 753).
"I S. Rep. No. 96-916, 96"' Cong., 2,d Sess. (Aug. 26, 1980) (cited in Shields, supra note 105, at
965-66).
112 Pub.L. 96-359.
113 21 USC § 350.
" FDA Food Advisory Committee Meeting on Infant Formula, available at http://www.fda.
gov/ohrms/docketsacO2/briefing13852bl_01 .htm.
IS It was not until 1982, however, in the aftermath of another crisis, that FDA finally issued rules
insisting on regular nutritional testing of infant formula products. The regulations were put in place
after it was reported that Wyeth Laboratories had accidentally omitted vitamin B6 from one or more
batches of formula, potentially putting infants at risk of convulsions or even brain damage.
"6 PDUFA was enacted in 1992 and requires pharmaceutical companies to pay application fees
to FDA for new products as well as annual product and manufacturing fees. The Act was a response
to industry frustration at the length of time it took to get a new drug to market-a median time of 29
months in the late 1980s. The original Act was set to expire on September 30, 2007. H.R. REP 110-225,
110th Congress, 1st Session; FDAAA of 2007 [version is HR 2900], July 11,2007, at 5. The additional
funds are used to expedite the review and approval of new drug applications and to improve post-market
drug safety activities. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), Pub. L.
No. 110-85, § 101(c), 121 Stat. 823, 825 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and elsewhere).
17 FDAAA § 502, 121 Stat. at 876.
"8 Id. at 866.
I d. at 863.
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trial registration. It expanded the existing clinical trial registry databank and made
sure that database information was available to the public on the internet.
120
The final two components, dealing with drug safety and food safety, respectively,
will be the primary subject of discussion here. FDAAA's drug safety provisions
emerged in the wake of a scandal surrounding the testing and marketing of Merck's
blockbuster drug Vioxx. The Act gave FDA authority to require post-approval
product studies and/or labeling changes based on new safety information. 121 In
addition, it required that the public be given greater access to the drug information
that FDA reviews prior to approval. While manufacturers were already under an
obligation to report adverse events associated with their products, under the new
legislation that requirement was extended to health care professionals. It was hoped
that the new system would be more effective at capturing adverse events than its
predecessor-FDA estimated that only one in ten adverse effects were identified
under the prior system. 22 An additional provision also related to drug safety im-
posed stricter conflict of interest rules for FDA advisory committees.
2
1
Finally, in response to an incident involving the widespread contamination of pet
food and the deaths of companion animals, the Act contained new requirements
governing food safety, including stricter ingredient and labeling standards, the cre-
ation of an adulterated food registry,124 and improvements in public notification in
the event of a recall of contaminated food. 25 A separate section dealt specifically
with the safety of pet food in particular.
26
1. Drug Safety - The Story of Vioxx
In May 1999, FDA approved Merck's drug Vioxx for use in patients with arthritis
and short term acute pain. 127 Vioxx is a COX-2 inhibitor, a non-steroidal anti-inflam-
matory drug-the second of its kind to be approved by FDA. One study indicated
that Vioxx would result in fewer negative gastrointestinal effects than existing non-
steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs. 128 Because it was found to represent a significant
improvement over drugs currently on the market, it was granted "priority review,"
meaning that it was fast-tracked for approval. FDA aims to approve priority review
drugs in an average of six months, compared with ten months for those drugs offer-
ing only a modest improvement over existing treatments.129 Shortening the approval
time for certain drugs has been credited by FDA with, among other things, making
new cancer and AIDS treatments available to patients more quickly.
30
Even before its approval, questions were raised about Vioxx's cardiovascular
risks. However, Merck declined to conduct a study of these risks, and FDA did
not require one. In 2002, as part of its approval of a gastrointestinal benefit claim
for Vioxx, FDA required that Merck include information about cardiovascular
120 FDAAA § 801(a), 121 Stat. at 905.
121 FDAAA § 901, 121 Stat. at 922.
122 FDA Media Teleconference, Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Sept.
27, 2007, available at http://www.fda.gov/bbsltranscriptsltranscriptO92707.pdf.
123 FDAAA § 701, 121 Stat. at 900.
124 FDAAA § 1005, 121 Stat. at 964.
125 FDAAA § 1103, 121 Stat. at 963.
1216 FDAAA § 1002, 121 Stat. at 963.
127 Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx's History and the Need for Better Procedures and Better Testing, 37
Seton Hall L. Rev. 941, 945 (2006-2007).
128 Id. at 945 (2006-2007).
129 Carlos Rados, The FDA Speeds Medical Treatments for Serious Diseases, FDA CONSUMER
MAGAZINE, Mar./Apr. 2006, available at http:/lwww.fda.gov/fdac/features/2006/206_treatments.
html#review.
13' Gilhooley, supra note 127, at 945.
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risks on the drug's label, but was forced to negotiate with the company about the
placement and wording of the warning. The outcome of those negotiations was a
warning that has been described as "tepid."''
The real Vioxx story broke on the first day of October, 2004, when the New York
Times ran a front-page story reporting that Merck had voluntarily withdrawn Vioxx
from the market after a trial to measure the drug's potential to prevent colon cancer
showed a statistically significant risk of cardiovascular events in those taking the
drug.3 I Vioxx's companion drug, Celebrex, marketed by Pfizer, stayed on the market
but added a prominent boxed warning on cardiovascular risks.'33
The media went wild. A Google news search for "Vioxx" yields almost 10,000
articles in 2004 alone. The New York Times has published over 100 articles on the
drug since its recall. National Public Radio devoted over 50 segments to Vioxx
coverage. According to a poll sponsored by the Wall Street Journal, nearly half of
all adults in the United States followed the news coverage of Vioxx's withdrawal
from the market.'34
Congress reacted. In a public statement, Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts
remarked that "the American public deserves to know that the prescription drugs
their doctors prescribe are safe and effective," and that "the FDA gold standard
has been tarnished [by the Vioxx incident]."' 35 Multiple Congressional hearings
were held to discuss the revelations about Vioxx and the subsequent fallout.'36 At
a hearing of the Senate Finance Committee convened by Senator Charles Grassley,
one of the witnesses pointed out the crisis-to-crisis evolutionary pattern of food
and drug laws. David Graham, Associate Director for Science and Medicine in
FDA's Office of Drug Safety, supplemented his testimony with an exhibit showing
the 1938 Congressional response to elixir sulfanilamide and the 1962 response to
thalidomide. He then noted, with some hyperbole, that "today in 2004, we're faced
with what may be the single greatest drug safety catastrophe in the history of this
country."' 37 In Graham's opinion, FDA could have prevented the Vioxx incident
and had "let the American people down." He proposed that his office was very
much in need of structural improvement.1
38
In response to Vioxx and other high-profile incidents, including allegations that
FDA was delinquent in reporting studies linking the use of anti-depressants in children
"" Id. at 946-49.
3 Gina Kolata. A Widely Used Arthritis Drug is Withdrawn, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at Al.
3 Gilhooley, supra note 127, at 951. The Celebrex website also carries the following message,
which was probably intended to soothe consumer fears rather than provide information:
Lately, there has been confusion about some arthritis pain treatments. It is important to
know that there are risks with all medicines, including the 3 most common prescription
NSAIDs: CELEBREX, naproxen, and ibuprofen. In fact, the FDA requires all prescription
NSAID pain relievers, including CELEBREX, to have the same cardiovascular warning.
13' Health Care Poll: Nearly Half of U.S. Adults Closely Following News Coverage of Vioxx
Withdrawal, Wall St. J Online, Dec. 10, 2004, available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/news-
letters/wsjhealthnewslWSJOnline HIHealth-CarePoll2004vol3_iss24.pdf (poll conducted by Harris
Interactive).
131 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Idea of Drug Safety Office is Already Hitting Snags, N.Y TIMES, Nov.
25, 2004, at A30. The article notes that the idea of a drug safety office independent from the FDA was
endorsed by the AMA and had been periodically suggested in the past in the wake of high-profile drug
scandals. Id.
136 See, e.g., The Roles of FDA and Pharmaceutical Companies in Ensuring the Safety of Approved
Drugs, Like Vioxx, Hearing Before the House Comm. on Gov. Reform, 109th Cong. (2005); FDAs
Drug Approval Process: Up to the Challenge?: Hearing Before the S. Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions
Comm., 1091h Cong. (2005); The FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First: Hearing Before
the S. Fin. Comm., 108"' Cong. (2004).
13" The FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First: Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm.,
108th Cong. Nov. 18, 2004 (testimony of David Graham).
138 Id.
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to suicidal behavior, Congress commissioned a report from its investigative arm, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO).'39 The report found that the FDA suf-
fered from acute structural problems that prevented transparency and coordination
on drug safety issues, as well as a lack of authority to require post-market studies of
approved prescription drugs.'
According to the bill's sponsors, FDAAAs drug provisions were a direct reac-
tion to the Vioxx scandal. Representative John Dingell attested that the legislation's
postmarket surveillance provisions were inserted "with the goal of reducing the
likelihood of another Vioxx situation."'' Similarly, during House hearings on the
bill, Representative Henry Waxman asserted that "our goal here is to address tragic
situations like Vioxx."' 42 While the Vioxx scandal may not have been solely responsible
for the drug safety provisions, it was certainly no less an impetus for legislation than
the thalidomide or elixir sulfanilamide scandals were in their day.
2. Food Safety - the Pet Food Crisis
Vioxx was not the only FDA scandal fueling the passage of FDAAA. Consensus
was also building to strengthen the nation's food safety regulation in the wake of
multiple high-profile contamination incidents. Early versions of FDAAA contained
no food safety provisions-these provisions were added primarily due to national
outcry over the contamination of pet food from China, which led to the deaths of
over one thousand cats and dogs.
Food-borne illness is hardly a new phenomenon. Each year, one in four Ameri-
cans suffers from a food-borne complaint.'43 Of these estimated 76 million instances,
approximately 5,000 cases a year result in death.'" Despite the pervasiveness of
food-related illness, however, it took an incident like the pet food crisis to generate
sufficient support for new, stronger legislation. One explanation for the tidal wave
of public support in the wake of that incident is that it was the culmination of a
bad media year for food safety. During 2007, significant outbreaks were traced to
bagged spinach, lettuce, peanut butter, seafood, chili, and green beans. 45 Another
reason has to do with the nature of the crisis itself. Because so many Americans
are pet owners, even those who were not directly affected by the crisis may have
139 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA's
POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS (2006), available at, http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d06402.pdf.
140 Id. at 4-6.
'4' Congressional Record, House, July 11, 2007, at 7600.
4 Congressional Record, Sept. 19, 2007, at 10598. House Subcommittee on Health Chairman Frank
Pallone elaborated in his opening statement for a 2007 hearing on drug safety, noting that the recent "revela-
tions about drug safety.., have shaken public confidence .... [Flrom Vioxx to Paxil, tens of thousands of
patients have been placed in harms [sic] way due to the failings of our current drug safety system."
"I Bill Lambrecht, Congress Takes Aim at the FDA, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 4, 2008, at
A12.
144 Noam Levey, FDA Reform Likely to Take Back Seat in Obama Plan; Despite Push for Legisla-
tion, 'Dysfunctional' Agency Overshadowed, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 22, 2008 Monday, at 15A.
'41 See, e.g, FDA News Release, FDA Warns About Potential for Botulism in Canned Green Beans,
Dec. 21, 2007; Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109 th Cong.,
2nd Session, Food Safety: Current Challenges and New Ideas to Safeguard Consumers, Wed. Nov. 15,
2008 (statement of Robert E. Brackett, Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Food
and Drug Administration) (discussing e-coli outbreak in spinach and FDA's response); Is America's
Food Supply Safe? E. coli in Spinach, Salmonella in Peanut Butter - a String of Recent Contamination has
Prompted Question about Food Safety, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007, at 22; 628 Sickened by Peanut Butter,
L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2007, at C3; Andrew Martin, FDA Curbs Sale of Five Seafoods Farmed in China, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29,2007, at A l; FDA Warns Consumers About Risk of Botulism Poisoning from Hot Dog Chili
Sauce Marketed Under a Variety of Brand Names, FOOD AND DRUG LAW WEEKLY, Aug. 10, 2007, at 33.
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experienced an increased sense of vulnerability that prompted them to seek legisla-
tive redress.
Studies suggest that the pet food's toxicity resulted from a deadly combination
of melamine, added to artificially boost protein levels, and cyanuric acid, which
together caused kidney damage in dogs and cats.146 In all, FDA received more than
17,000 complaints about tainted pet food.147 The crisis culminated in a class-action
settlement involving more than 6,000 claims by pet owners whose pets became ill
or died after eating the contaminated food. 148 Menu Foods and other pet food
manufacturers and retailers implicated in the scandal agreed to pay $24 million to
compensate the class. 4 Two Chinese firms and an American importer have also
been indicted in criminal proceedings for alleged intent to defraud and mislead
American manufacturers. 10
In response to public furor, the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of
the House Energy and Commerce Committee held hearings in April 2007 entitled
"Diminished Capacity: Can the FDA Assure the Safety and Security of the Nation's
Food Supply?" Shortly thereafter, Senator Dick Durbin and Representative Rosa
DeLauro introduced companion bills in the Senate and the House, both entitled
"The Human and Pet Food Safety Act of 2007."''l The bills would have given FDA
authority to take mandatory recall action in addition to improving inspections
of imported food and ensuring the safety of pet food. In a shift of strategy, these
efforts were abandoned and Senator Durbin instead introduced an amendment
containing several food safety provisions to the drug and device bill then under
consideration. 1
52
Media coverage operated both to amplify public attention and to pressure
Congress to take action. Consider the following statement by Senator Mike Enzi
(R-WY), made in the final weeks before the passage of FDAAA:
"Food safety has been making news lately. From Salmonella in peanut
butter, to Chinese seafood with banned antibiotics, to contaminated pet
food, we hear a constant drumbeat of food safety problems that we must
address... When Americans purchase a snack, eat at a restaurant, or sit
down to dinner with their families, they should be able to expect that the
food they eat will nourish them, not make them ill. We need to restore that
faith, and I am working with my colleagues to develop a comprehensive,
effective strategy to enhance food safety.'
'1 53
Although the bill's original focus was not on food safety issues, Senators Enzi
and Ted Kennedy, citing the concerns about melamine in pet food and the recent
outbreaks of contamination in grocery products, sought to ensure that the food
146 Tainted Pet Food Likely Killed 347, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Michigan), Nov. 30, 2007, at A6.




IS0 Louise Story, Indictments in Pet Food Poisoning, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at Cl.
1 DONNA V. PORTER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FOOD SAFETY: PROVISIONS IN THE FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2007 at 2 (Jan. 8, 2007).
52 Id. at 2.
153 Enzi: Report on Import Safety a Good Start to Improve, Enhance Safety of Imported Food
Products, Congressional Documents and Publications, Sept. 10, 2007 (U.S. Senate Docs).
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safety amendments were included in the version of the bill that ultimately passed.' 4
The final version passed the House on September 19 with overwhelming bipar-
tisan support. Only seven members voted against it. In the Senate, the vote was
unanimous.
The language of FDAAA explicitly acknowledges the significance of the previous
year's outbreaks. Section X, which deals with food safety, begins with a Congres-
sional finding that:
(2) illnesses and deaths of individuals and companion animals caused
by contaminated food-
(A) have contributed to a loss of public confidence in food safety;
and
(B) have caused significant economic losses to manufacturers and
producers not responsible for contaminated food items. 55
The Act requires that the Secretary improve information-gathering and public
communication in the event of a recall. 56 The Secretary must also establish, within
one year of the Act's passage, a Reportable Food Registry for the aggregation of
information about tainted food products. Food manufacturers, processors, packers,
and holders must generally report such food products within twenty-four hours of
discovering the problem.'57
With respect to pet food, the new law requires that, within two years of its passage,
the Secretary of Health and Human Services must provide ingredient standards
and definitions as well as processing standards. The agency must also ensure that
pet food labeling includes nutritional and ingredient information.'58 Within a year,
the Secretary must establish an early warning and surveillance system to identify
adulteration of the pet food supply and outbreaks of pet food-related illness.'59
The language of the legislation acknowledges that further measures are needed. A
nonbinding "Sense of the Congress" section concluded that Congress must provide
FDA with "additional resources, authorities, and direction with respect to ensuring
the safety of the food supply," that FDA needed additional inspectors, and that
additional agreements with trading partners were required due to the increasing
volume of international trade in food products. ' 60 The legislation also underscores
the importance of working toward the development of a comprehensive legislative
response to the issue of food safety.' 6 1 Given the public response to the pet food
crisis, however, there appeared to be a pervasive conviction on Capitol Hill that an
interim solution was essential. As of the writing of this article, there have been no
'51 Zachary Richardson, Senate Passes FDA Revitalization Act, FDA Food Chemical News, May
14, 2007, at 15. In response to the Senate's approval of his 2007 amendment on food safety, Senator
Durbin described the amendment as responding to the food safety concerns "in the wake of nationwide
recalls and quarantines of tainted pork, spinach, peanut butter and pet food."
155 FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. 2101(2)(A), (B) (2007).
156 FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. 2103. The section requires that all information regarding pet food and
human food recalls be posted in a single location on the FDA website, which must include a searchable
index of recalled foods "that is easily accessed and understood by the public."
157 FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. 350f. Public health officials must also submit reports about food incidents.
Id.
158 FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. 2102(a).
159 FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. 2102(b).
I- FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. 2107(a), (b), and (c).
161 FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. 2107(d).
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food contamination crises to rival the magnitude of those that triggered FDAAA's
food safety provisions, and no further legislation has been passed.
The food and drug safety provisions of FDAAA may therefore be seen as
Congressional responses to a series of highly-publicized crises. The legislation fits
neatly into the pattern of food and drug laws chronicled in this Part, all of which
were at least partially motivated, by public outcry following a food or drug crisis.
Given the prevalence of this phenomenon, its mechanics deserve further study.
III. THE CRISIS RESPONSE MECHANISM
The above Part charted a brief history of the role crises have played in food and
drug legislation. This section will examine the chain of events connecting safety
scandals to legislative reform. It will suggest a pattern consistent with the first two
steps in Breyer's "vicious circle," public overreaction and Congressional response,
as well as the sociological literature examining the social amplification of risk. It
posits that, whether the triggering event be contaminated vaccines, a reported rash
of birth defects, or the death of companion animals from adulterated pet food,
public perceptions of risk are colored by cognitive limitations, magnified by media
coverage, and reinforced by peer responses. In the cases of the crises chronicled
above, the furor eventually built to a point where rent-seeking members of Congress
could only ignore its effects at their peril.
A. Public Perceptions and Cognitive Biases
A growing body of work acknowledges that human beings often fail to make
rational decisions in their everyday lives.162 As individuals, we lack comprehensive
information about the increasingly complex world around us. When presented with
situations about which we have imperfect knowledge, we evaluate them using an
array of heuristics, or rules of thumb. These heuristics simplify the task at hand,
but may result in decisional errors, which can be magnified by inherent biases. Reli-
ance on intuition is essential because we simply do not have the time or resources to
become universal experts. The problem is particularly acute when laypeople attempt
to estimate the magnitude of risk. Breyer, emphasizing this failing in describing
the "vicious circle," writes that people "simplify radically" in estimating risk, which
"may help cut a swath through the modern information jungle," but "oversimplifies
dramatically and thereby inhibits an understanding of risks .... ""I
Estimating risk in the face of a crisis, whether that crisis takes the form of food con-
tamination or the unwitting approval of a dangerous drug, is complicated by several
well-known heuristics and biases, including the "availability heuristic" as well as our
natural predisposition to become more fearful of risks with certain characteristics.
In a seminal article published in 1987, Paul Slovic sought to explain why people
are unable to evaluate relative risk correctly.164 He concluded that certain risk char-
62 For a good introduction to the literature from a lawmaking perspective, see CASS SUNSTEIN, ED.,
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000). See also William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Structuring
Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 616 (2002).
163 STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 35
(1993).
164 Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280 (1987).
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acteristics produce a disproportionate public reaction leading to a greater desire
for regulation. Fears about drug side effects and food contamination may be more
pronounced than warranted because they possess many of these attributes. Slovic
discovered, for instance, that people may overestimate the magnitude of risks that
are unobservable and whose exact natures are unknown.165 Food and drug risks fall
into these categories because, unlike risks from reckless driving, for instance, the
potential harm from adulterated substances or drugs with dangerous side effects
is not readily apparent. Similarly, establishing the extent and nature of the risk is
often a time consuming process fraught with uncertainties.
In addition to filtering our perceptions through inherent biases, we are often
guided by what has become known as the "availability heuristic" in estimating risk
magnitude. According to this heuristic, risks that are more prominent, or available,
will appear to be of greater consequence. Selective media coverage plays a key role
in determining risk "availability".
B. Media Amplification
There is a low correlation between the attention hazards receive in the press
and the magnitude of the risk associated with those hazards, as measured by the
number of annual deaths with which they are associated. 16 6 Consider the common
fear of air travel. In a 1989 study, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Profes-
sor Arnold Barnett examined the New York Times' selection of stories for its front
page. Barnett found that, per 1000 deaths in each category, the newspaper ran 1.7
front page murder stories, 2.3 front page HIV/AIDS stories, and only .02 front page
cancer stories. In striking contrast, there were 138.2 front page plane crash stories
per 1,000 deaths.'67 These results yield important clues about why the fear of flying
is so widespread, as well as the effect of the media on popular perception.
Disproportionate coverage of sensational events like plane crashes dramatically
increases their salience for the general public and leads readers to form an errone-
ously high estimate of how likely such disasters are to occur. A mechanism that has
been termed the "availability cascade" magnifies the effect. Timur Kuran and Cass
Sunstein define availability cascades as "social cascades.., through which expressed
perceptions trigger chains of individual responses that make these perceptions ap-
pear increasingly plausible through their rising availability in public discourse." '68
Thus, impressions from a front page news story about a plane crash accompanied
by graphic photos are likely to be passed along from person to person, becoming
more and more "available" as the news spreads.
In their article on availability cascades, Kuran and Sunstein cite the case of
Alar, a pesticide used primarily on apples from the 1960s through 1980s. In 1989,
Uniroyal, which manufactured Alar, concluded that exposure to Alar resulted
in higher incidences of tumors in rodents. The National Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) translated this finding into the statement that one in 4,200
preschool children would develop cancer by age six if exposed to Alar. A media
165 Id. at 282 fig. 1.
166 See, e.g., Barbara Combs and Paul Slovic, Newspaper Coverage of Causes of Death, 56 Journal-
ism Q. 837 (1979) (observing that the number of deaths caused by various hazards had little to do with
the likelihood of their coverage in two daily newspapers).
67 Catherine Trevison, Safety Statistics Fail to Settle Fliers' Nerves, THE OREGONIAN, Feb. 6, 2000,
at AO.
68 Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Controlling Availability Cascades, in SUNSTEIN, ED., BE-
HAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMIcs 374-375 (2000).
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flurry ensued, including a "60 Minutes" segment depicting an apple covered by
a skull and crossbones. Apple consumption plummeted. Subsequent analyses by
the EPA and the United Nations, among others, revealed that the earlier results
were flawed and that Alar posed no danger to humans. But the new information
failed to displace the already ingrained social perception that apples posed a risk
to children's health. The damage to the apple industry was done.
169
The media contributes to these effects in two ways: by devoting disproportionate
space to reporting selected events, and by framing those events as catastrophic
in order to capture the public interest. The latter tactic feeds the cognitive bias
dubbed the "framing effect." Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman have shown
that people react differently to logically identical scenarios producing exactly
the same result, depending on how the scenario is presented. 7 ' While Tversky
and Kahneman focused their research on risk preferences, this effect is present
in any situation in which people are called upon to evaluate information and
choose between alternatives. 7' For instance, framing a news story about a case
of food contamination by emphasizing the speed of the FDA's response and ef-
fective containment of the problem would be expected to cause much less public
anxiety than a story focusing on the fact that a baby was seriously sickened by
the incident. The latter story, however, makes better news.
The unfortunate reality is that stories about danger and suffering capture the
human imagination more effectively than stories about bureaucratic response.
Reporting on accidents sells papers, while reporting on risk in the absence of a
negative event is typically not considered "newsworthy." As an example, consider
news stories covering the space shuttle program. Eleanor Singer and Phyllis
Endreny found that no newspaper articles covering the space shuttle made any
mention of the potential risks to astronauts until the Challenger exploded shortly
after launch on January 28, 1986.172 After the accident, however, a wave of media
coverage focused in great detail on those risks.'73
Similarly, journalistic prizes are handed out for exposing government failure,
not for presenting a nuanced view of the bureaucracy. Upton Sinclair's The Jungle,
with its graphic portrayal of the meat-packing industry in turn of the century
Chicago, became an instant bestseller. The Los Angeles Times won a Pulitzer
Prize in 2001 for investigating drugs with dangerous side effects that the FDA
approved and later had to recall in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 17 4 Less egre-
gious problems also become front page news. Ironically, as our society becomes
safer, any hint of risk of disease or death has become newsworthy.'75 In today's
69 Id. at 378-79.
170 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 Econometrica 263 (1979).
"I' For a survey of work on frames and framing in the social and cognitive sciences, see James
N. Druckman, The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence, 23 Political Behavior 225,
226-31 (2001).
172 ELEANOR SINGER AND PHYLLIS M. ENDRENY, REPORTING ON RISK: How THE MASS MEDIA PORTRAY
ACCIDENTS, DISEASES, DISASTERS, AND OTHER HAZARDS 22 (1993).
'7 Id. Singer and Endreny identify a pattern of concentrated media coverage in the immediate
aftermath of a hazardous event that soon dies down, not because the problems that led to the event
have necessarily been resolved, but because in the absence of new developments the public imagination
moves on.
174 HAWTHORNE, supra note 53, at 140.
'75 Mark Neal, Risk Aversion: The Rise of an Ideology, in LAURA JONES, ED., SAFE ENOUGH? MEASUR-
ING RISK AND REGULATION 13 (2000). Neal identifies a dozen devices by which the media can exaggerate
the nature of a risk, including conflating coincidence and causality, using imagery, sentimentalizing the
victims, and omitting the costs and dangers of regulation. Id. at 23-28.
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relatively risk-free environment, stories about food and drug safety often make
front page news."6
The media can be a powerful tool for influencing behavior. For instance, Pfizer
withdrew its diabetes drug Rezulin from the market voluntarily after the Los Angeles
Times published an article called "The Rise and Fall of the Killer Drug Rezulin.
' 177
But the headlines do not convey the whole story. According to one recent article, a
series of "deadly food-borne disease outbreaks.., called public attention to gap-
ing holes in the FDAs capacity to stay on top of a rapidly expanding market.'
'1 78
While neither the seriousness of each of these occurrences nor the suffering of the
affected families should be minimized, the annual number of food-borne illnesses
has remained relatively constant.
179
Because the public lacks the ability to estimate the relative seriousness of many
risks, media sensationalization creates pressure on government to address even
minor risks. The public often desires that risks be eliminated, not simply managed.
Some have attributed this preference to the fact that, at least in much of the Western
world, we are confronted with many fewer risks today than past societies.8 0 This
creates a false sense of entitlement to a risk-free existence, and the idea that the
government can and should be providing an ultimately unrealistic level of safety.
Thus legislative priorities, which should ideally be rationally determined, are in-
fluenced instead by media and flawed public perceptions.
C. Congressional Response
Breyer argues that government regulation is distorted by sensational media reports
of disasters that affect relatively few citizens.'8' The above section discussed how cog-
nitive error may lead to public overreaction after food and drug crises. This section
attempts to explain how that overreaction can trigger a Congressional response.
Public choice theory teaches us that lawmakers, no less than ordinary citizens,
are utility maximizing rational actors. Most legislators desire to stay in office-a
perfectly natural ambition. To do so, they must continue to satisfy the expressed
preferences of their constituents.I 2 Public attitudes about risk therefore affect the
176 The following is a sample of headlines from the front page of the Chicago Tribune dealing with
food and drug investigations: "U.S. Orders Probe of Saccharin Safety," CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE, Oct.
21, 1969 at 1; Poison-Laced Tylenol Found in California, Jerry Crimmins and Jove Brown, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Oct. 6, 1982 at AI; Michael L. Millenson, FDA: America's Watchdog in Distress (three-part
series), CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 18, 1983, at I (opening with stories of a man who died in an Arizona
restaurant after an allergic reaction to a food preservative, a woman collapsing from shock after taking
a prescription pain killer, and a nurse discovering that the amount of medication being administered to
an infant through an intravenous pump was incorrect); Ronald Kotulak, Food Irradiation: Consumers'
Boon or Safety Threat?, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 26, 1984 at El; FDA Erred on Drug Tied to Deaths,
May 15, 1984, at I (chronicling story of vitamin E drug given to premature infants).
177 David Willman, The Rise and Fall of the Killer Drug Rezulin, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 2000, at Al
(cited in Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs, 5 Yale J. Health Pol'y &
Ethics 741, 744 (2005)).
'71 Noam Levey, FDA Reform Likely to Take Back Seat in Obama Plan; Despite Push for Legisla-
tion, 'Dysfunctional' Agency Overshadowed, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 22, 2008 Monday, at 15A.
179 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, FoodNet Facts and Figures, Percent Change in the
Incidence of Laboratory-Confirmed Bacterial Infections in 2007 Compared With the Previous 3 Years
(2004-2006), available at http:llwww.cdc.govlfoodnetlfactsandfiguresllO.pdf.
I"o See Neal, supra note 28, at 23-28.
181 Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008.
12 See Bender & Lott, Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of the Literature, 87 Pub.
Choice 67, 89 (1996) (surveying empirical studies and finding that legislative voting behavior is highly
correlated to the interests of constituents).
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likelihood that legislation to address those risks will be enacted." 3 Most of the time,
public preferences are diverse and no one interest predominates. James Madison,
in defending a stronger federal government in the Federalist Papers, argued that
in larger societies the dangers of factionalism will be reduced because it becomes
more difficult to secure a majority for any given proposition.1 4 A national crisis
upsets that balance. Vanderbilt University economist Kip Viscusi cautions that
while "responding to citizen fears may be a 'rational' political act that maximizes
popular support," it may not lead to rational risk decisions at the societal level. 8
Congressional attention to public priorities, even in the face of other, seemingly
more pressing responsibilities, is unquestioned. Despite the ongoing financial crisis
and our continued embroilment in two wars, for example, the House of Represen-
tatives found the time this spring to consider and pass the Captive Primate Safety
Act, which prohibits the interstate sale and transport of monkeys and apes. The
motivation for this bill was the highly-publicized mauling of a Connecticut woman
by a neighbor's pet chimpanzee.'86 In a statement, House Natural Resources Com-
mittee Chairman Nick Rahall cautioned that, while "[i]mages of 'Curious George'.
. may lead us to believe that these creatures are cuddly and harmless. .. last week's
tragedy and other similar attacks stand as evidence that this is not the case-that
they are in fact wild animals and they simply must not be kept as pets."' 87 The move
was popular, but some may question whether, given the finite resources available
to legislators, their time and effort could have been better spent.
Members of Congress have openly acknowledged the pressure this phenomenon
puts on their ability to prioritize in a rational manner. In a 2005 hearing on FDA's
drug approval process, Senator Kennedy remarked that he had discerned a "rule of
legislating" over the years "that if it is worth reacting to, it is worth overreacting to,
and part of our job is to make sure that we don't overreact but that we appropriately
react."' 88 Unfortunately, as Senator Kennedy implied, that check does not always
operate. Thus Congress may, as Breyer suggested, contribute to the cycle of over-
reaction by devoting too many resources to a legislative response in a never-ending
quest for constituent approbation.
IV. COMPETING PARADIGMS
If we accept that crises have played a role in the passage of food and drug legis-
lation, the question remains as to whether that influence is harmful. The previous
Part builds on Breyer's view, as embodied by the "vicious circle" metaphor, that
public reaction to risk can be a pernicious influence on the legislative process. But
Breyer's model is not the only possible lens through which this phenomenon may
be viewed. Accordingly, this Part will describe three competing paradigms: the
"Knee-Jerk" paradigm, the "Crisis as Catalyst" paradigm, and the "Necessary
Evil" paradigm.
"I Roger G. Noll and James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regula-
tion, in CASS SUNSTEIN ED., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2007), at 326.
114 James Madison, "Federalist No. 10," in CLINTON ROSSITER (ED.), THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 81,
(1961).
"I KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 104 (1998).
186 Richard Cowan, US. House Votes to Stop Interstate Chimp Trade, REUTERS, Feb. 24, 2009.
187 Id.
"88 Hearing of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th Congress,
1 st Session, FDA's Drug Approval Process: Up to the Challenge? Mar. 1, 2005 (statement of Senator Ken-
nedy).
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A. The "Knee-Jerk" Paradigm
One description of the pattern of crises and response in the history of food and
drug legislation may be termed the "Knee-Jerk" paradigm. According to this view,
which most closely tracks Breyer's "vicious circle" metaphor, post-crisis legislation
is an irrational and often ineffective reaction to widely publicized events by vote-
seeking members of congress.
Legislation enacted subsequent to a disaster, according to this paradigm, is largely
symbolic with respect to the problem legislators are ostensibly seeking to remedy.
The actual text of the 1962 Drug Amendments, for example, had little to do with
preventing a drug like thalidomide from being approved in this country. The 1938
Act's safety provisions, it should be recalled, were sufficient to keep thalidomide
from the market in the United States. Furthermore, the 1962 Amendments focused
primarily on efficacy, not safety.189
Even if the legislation does address the events that led to the crisis, according
to the "Knee-Jerk" paradigm it is likely that its provisions will not reflect the best
thinking about how to remedy weaknesses in existing law. The need for expediency
is high in these circumstances because legislators desire to be seen as responding
to public outcry. These conditions make it doubtful that resulting legislation will
be the product of careful, reasoned problem-solving.
Legislators may also fail to fund new agency mandates, because they receive the
political benefits of having enacted new legislation in the face of crisis regardless
of whether FDA's current budget will enable it to fulfill additional responsibili-
ties. Thus, "Knee-Jerk" responses to crises may be ineffective and/or may draw
resources away from existing agency programs. At a hearing of the House Energy
and Commerce Committee last January, Catherine Woteki, a member of FDAs
Science Board, testified that crisis management in the Center for Food Safety and
Applied Nutrition and the Center for Veterinary Medicine had sapped attention
and resources, preventing FDA from developing the science and infrastructure base
necessary to support industry innovation and provide adequate surveillance. 190 At
the same hearing, former FDA General Counsel Peter Barton Hutt went further,
asserting that FDA was dangerously underfunded and was "barely hanging on by
its fingertips." '191
Another problem with crisis legislation, according to the "Knee-Jerk" paradigm,
is that legislators may fail to consider the opportunity costs of focusing on this
particular societal ill as opposed to less highly publicized problems. The danger
is that a myopic focus on issues of public concern will cause legislators to neglect
other risks that in fact pose greater dangers. The chimpanzee legislation, discussed
above, represents just such a dilemma.
189 It would be hyperbole to argue, however, that legislation enacted in the wake of the crises
described in Part II was purely symbolic. A counterpoint may be seen in China's reaction to interna-
tional condemnation for its role in the pet food scandal, as well as scandals surrounding contaminated
toothpaste and other household goods. To prove its commitment to improving the safety of its exports,
China executed its former top food and drug regulator. Joseph Kahn, China Executes Former Drug
Regulator, N.Y TIMES, Jul. 10, 2007.
I" House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Science and Mission at Risk: FDAs Self-Assessment (Jan. 29, 2008) (statement of Catherine E. Woteki),
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte-mtgs 11 0-oi-hrg.0 12908. FDASelfAssessment.
shtml.
191 Id. (statement of Peter Barton Hutt, Senior Partner, Covington & Burling LLP), available at
http:l/energycommerce.house.govlcmte-mtgs/l 10-oi-hrg.012908.Hutt-Testimony.pdf
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Crisis legislation may even be counterproductive. While the 1962 Amendments
may have generated political capital for its sponsors, it put in place a complex and
time consuming approval process that has delayed a significant number of beneficial
drugs from reaching the marketplace. Some critics argue that these costs outweighed
any benefits produced by the new legislation.192 Others go even further, describing
the 1962 Amendments as having caused more actual deaths than they prevented.193
According to the literature on cognitive biases, both legislators and members of the
public may favor errors of omission over errors of commission. 194 In other words,
the public is less likely to condemn FDA for a failure to approve a drug that could
have saved or extended lives than it is to punish the agency for approving a drug that
later causes injury or death in even a small number of people. Even if the absolute
number of lives saved may decrease if expensive and time consuming hurdles are
added to the drug approval process, the public may favor the legislation.
The "Knee-Jerk" paradigm thus suggests that, consistent with Breyer's concerns,
a system in which legislators are motivated to create new laws only in the wake
of a crisis will produce legislation that fails to consider the bigger picture. Food
and drug laws, by this account, may give a disproportionate amount of attention
to infant formula and pet food, for example, while leaving less sensational risks
unaddressed.
B. The "Crisis as Catalyst" Paradigm
A second possible description of the mechanics at work may be termed the "Crisis
as Catalyst" paradigm. This paradigm posits that crises demonstrate significant
flaws in existing legislative and regulatory regimes that may not have been apparent
before the event. It suggests that post-crisis legislation is a rational reaction to new,
especially pointed evidence of systemic problems that demand attention but have
not been addressed due to informational deficit or regulatory failure.
According to this view, crises are an organic part of regulatory evolution. This
idea has its roots in the social science literature, where it goes by the name of "In-
crementalism." Charles E. Lindblom, a Professor of Economics at Yale University,
92 See, e.g., Barry S. Roberts & David Z. Bodenheimer, The Drug Amendments of 1962: The
Anatomy of a Regulatory Failure, 1982 Ariz. St. L.J. 581 (1982) (finding that the delays in getting a
drug to market and the increased costs of regulatory compliance under the Act decreased incentives for
research and innovation); Sam Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: the 1962
Drug Amendments, 81 J. Political Econ. 1049 (1973) (concluding that the 1962 amendments resulted
in substantial increases in costs for consumers); see also Sam Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer
Protection Legislation: the 1962 Drug Amendments, 83 J. Political Econ. 663 (1975) (responding to critics
and asserting that the 1962 amendments produced net costs to consumers, even when the benefits of the
law are taken into account). The costs and delays described in these articles have to some extent been
alleviated by the passage of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), enacted in 1992 and most
recently reauthorized in FDAAA. See FDA White Paper, Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA):
Adding Resources and Improving Performance in FDA Review of New Drug Applications, available
at http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/whitepaperl 1- l0/whitepaperl I - 10.html.
'13 Dale H. Gieringer, The Safety and Efficacy of New Drug Approval, 5 Cato J. 177, 188 (1985).
"' See, e.g. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998); Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, THE REGULATON
OF PHARMACEUTICALS 46 (1983) (classifying errors of commission as "type I" and errors of omission
as "type 2," and noting the existence of "strong incentives in our system for FDA to err on the side
of too much delay and to be overrestrictive in approvals"). A 1990 study applied this concept to par-
ents' reluctance to vaccinate their children, concluding that the parents favor the much greater risk of
avoiding the inoculation to the comparatively minimal risk that their child will suffer side effects from
the vaccine. lana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambiguity, 3 J.
Behav. Decision Making 263 (1990).
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is generally credited with originating this concept in his 1959 article entitled The
Science of Muddling Through.9 ' In complex areas of policymaking, Lindblom ar-
gued, humans are incapable of designing perfect systems because human rationality
is inherently limited.'96 Instead of striving to apply a universal theory to the task
and hope that first efforts will yield a fully-formed, all-inclusive scheme, Lindblom
advises, policy-makers should accept that incremental alterations will be required as
the policy is tested, with each test yielding useful information about its utility.97
A proponent of the "Crisis as Catalyst" theory would argue that the history of
food and drug legislation has been one of trial and error, in which the strength
and coverage of our laws and regulations gradually improves in response to events
highlighting the system's weaknesses. For instance, the Vioxx scandal and pet food
contamination incident revealed flaws in FDA's structure and operations, includ-
ing inadequate resources and a lack of coordination.'98 FDAAA, according to this
theory, was a logical and timely response to these revealed systemic weaknesses.
The "Crisis as Catalyst" theory is agnostic on whether systemic flaws that lead
to crises are susceptible to advance detection. Even if systemic shortcomings are
apparent to regulatory insiders, it may not be possible to achieve a legislative fix in
the absence of high-profile crises because of a lack of political will. The "Crisis as
Catalyst" theory posits that legislation enacted in response to crises often includes
important but unrelated measures that would have been difficult to pass had the
crisis not spurred legislative action. Proponents might point to the 1938 Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which languished in Congress for four years before
the elixir sulfanilamide tragedy. That Act contained much-needed improvements
to the 1906 law that had little to do with drug safety, including an expansion of
the government's regulatory authority to cosmetics. These improvements might
not have been possible, or might have taken much longer to implement, had there
been no such thing as elixir sulfanilamide.
C. The "Necessary Evil" Paradigm
The final paradigm, the "Necessary Evil" paradigm, concludes that irrespective
of the actual substance of the legislation, most post-crisis laws are a necessary
response to public outcry, consistent with the specific mandate of the FDA, demo-
cratic governance, and economic principles. According to this paradigm, Congress
should respond to food and drug crises even when legislation will fail to address
the immediate problem that triggered the crisis or will shift legislative and agency
resources away from equally pressing but less visible concerns.
In support of this view, consider that FDA could not achieve its mission without
public confidence in the products it regulates. There is thus an argument to be made
that even a purely symbolic response to a crisis is worthwhile if it succeeds in deter-
ring irrational public behavior that might undermine effective regulation.
An examination of the literature on the social amplification of risks serves to
strengthen this hypothesis. This literature argues that risk perception does not take
place in a vacuum. Rather, it is highly influenced by social norms, institutions,
and values. The media can serve as a proxy for such norms and values, acting as
"stations of amplification" that increase the salience of risk events for the general
"I Charles Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 Public Admin. Rev. 79 (1959).
196 MICHAEL T. HAYES, INCREMENTALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY 15 (2006).
117 Id. at 86.
98 See Why We Can't Trust Our Food, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 6, 2007, at A10.
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population. 99 Interestingly, the social impact of a risk event may be colored more
by social processes than by the actual characteristics of the event itself, such as
how many people are affected. 2°°
Much of the literature on the social amplification of risk focuses on ways in which
knowledge about risk perception can increase the effectiveness of risk communica-
tion.201 If the government can "manage" societal risk communication, it may be
able to prevent irrational reactions on the part of consumers. One way to do this
is to be seen as responding to public concern, even if the scope of the "crisis" is a
product of media amplification and public misperception.
The "pill scare" of 1995 in Great Britain is a lesson in the importance of a gov-
ernment response to public perceptions of increased risk. On October 18, 1995, the
Medicines Control Agency in Great Britain sent out nearly 200,000 letters to general
practitioners warning of possible increased risks of blood clotting for women taking
the latest generation of oral contraceptive pills. 202 The mailing was followed by a
press conference on the national news. 203 There was no indication of the absolute
risk associated with taking this medication, and in fact it was recommended that
women continue to take their current cycle of pills. But the "scare" itself generated
negative outcomes: many women failed to continue taking their birth control pills,
and the abortion rate in 1996 was 8% higher than in 1995, reversing a downward
trend.204 Taking legislative action after such a public scare, even if that action does
little to decrease actual risk levels, may serve the important purpose of calming
public fears and helping to restore public confidence.
In addition, while symbolic or minimally effective legislation may not prevent
another tragedy in the future, it may serve to counter some of the indirect harm
produced by events. According to Paul Slovic, like a stone dropped in a pond, an
adverse event may create a "ripple effect" that touches persons and institutions with
only tangential connections to the immediate victims. 25 This is especially true in
the case of low-probability events that carry a risk of serious harm. Cass Sunstein
gives an example of this phenomenon in his recent book, Worst Case Scenarios.
He points out that the harm from the 9/11 terrorist attacks was not limited to the
death and destruction caused by the attacks themselves. 20 6 People changed their
behaviors in reaction to the attacks, for instance by switching from flying to driv-
ing, an inherently more dangerous activity, which put them at greater risk. This
behavioral change alone may have caused as many as 1500 avoidable deaths,2 7 as
well as contributing to the decline of the airlines. New York City's tourist industry
suffered as well. Job loss in the wake of the attacks is estimated to have reduced
I" Julie Barnett & Glynis M. Breakwell, The Social Amplification of Risk andthe Hazard Sequence:
the October 1995 Oral Contraceptive Pill Scare, 5 Health, Risk & Society 301, 302 (2003).
200 Id.
201 See, e.g., Barnett & Breakwell, supra note 204; C. ALLISON, J. ROIZEN, AND P. OLIVIER, The
1995 Pill Scare: Women's Perceptions of Risk and Sources of Information, 23 British Journal Of Family
Planning,79, 79-82 (1997); P BENNETT, Understanding Responses to Risk: Some Basic Findings, in: P
BENNETr AND K. CALMAN (EDS.), RISK COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH (1999).
202 Barnett & Breakwell, supra note 201; at 306.
203 Id
204 Id. at 306-07.
20 Slovic, supra note 164, at 283.
206 CASS SUNSTEIN, WORST CASE SCENARIOS 139 (2007).
207 See Gerr Gigerenzer, Out of the Frying Pan Into the Fire: Behavioral Reactions to Terrorist
Attacks, 26 Risk Analysis 347, 350 (2006).
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income by between $3.5 and $6.4 billion, with the hotel and restaurant industries
among the hardest hit." 8
According to some estimates, the total cost of the terrorist attacks to New York
City, including lost property values, lost jobs, and lost income, may have been as
high as $8 billion. 9 Mark Zandi, chief economist at Economist.com, predicted
that "the more quickly and effectively President Bush's promised reprisals against
the terrorist network restore public confidence.., the more quickly the rebuilding
of Lower Manhattan will begin."2 ' The lesson to be gleaned from this example
is that even a symbolic legislative response to a crisis may restore sufficient public
confidence to mitigate psychological and economic impacts, especially those that
are the product of irrational fears.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
There appears to be ample evidence, at least in the arena of food and drug
legislation, to support Breyer's hypothesis that the way this country regulates risk
is closely tied to public perception and attendant Congressional reactions. The
public may respond irrationally to adverse events linked to unsafe food and drugs,
especially where the victims are children or other innocents, and especially where
the media undertakes to enhance the story and broadcasts it nationwide, thereby
magnifying its impact.
Lawmaking may inevitably be dominated by a crisis mentality. Certainly the
political mechanisms that facilitate this mode of operation are natural and well-
ensconced in our system of governance. It is as yet unclear whether this process
results in obligatory if imperfect public confidence building, as described by the
"Necessary Evil" paradigm, irrational risk regulation, as the "Knee-Jerk" para-
digm suggests, or rational gap-filling, as the "Crisis as Catalyst" paradigm posits.
In all likelihood, some combination of the three is at work. While the normative
implications of "crisis legislation" must be resolved elsewhere, the framework set
forth above lays the groundwork for such an analysis.
Regardless of which of the above paradigms best represents the mechanics of
crisis and response in United States food and drug legislation, two proposals may
help improve the quality of that response. First, where possible, the legislature
should engage in continuous maintenance rather than crisis response. The continu-
ous maintenance approach suggests that the legislature's task should be seen as
more analogous to "police patrols" than responding to "fire alarms" (emergency
situations in which constituent interests are at stake).21' Continuous maintenance
will increase the likelihood that, if a crisis points out flaws in existing legislative
schemes, those gaps will be narrower and more easily addressed.
It will also be important for interest groups and the media to find ways to make
the possibility of future catastrophes relevant to the public and to lawmakers before
they occur. In their book on how to prevent the disappearance of species, Paul and
Anne Ehrlich suggest that changing the nature of the debate will be crucial. They
propose analogizing the perils of extinction to watching worker pry rivets out of
208 Jason Bram, James Orr, and Carol Rapaport, Measuring the Effects of the September 11 At-
tack on New York City, 8 FRBNY Economic Policy Review 5, 15 (Nov. 2002).
209 Timothy Williams, New York City Economy Struggles After 9111, U.S. MAYOR NEWSPAPER, Sept.
9, 2002.
210 Mary Williams-Walsh, Urban Pain, From Sea to Sea, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001.
211 See Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 American J. of Political Science 165 (1984).
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a plane's wing while in flight.2 12 This kind of image, it is hoped, by making future
harms more salient in the present, will help to generate the necessary political will
to confront problems before they occur.
Second, assuming that it is inevitable that there will be greater political will to
pass legislation in the wake of a food or drug crisis, the best way to ensure intel-
ligent legislation may be to have carefully considered bills written and in reserve so
that when the crisis hits, responsive legislation is not the result of hurried drafting.
During the Senate debates on the 1962 Drug Amendments, when asked whether
disaster was a predicate to action on domestic policy issues, Senator Philip Hart
replied that "disaster helps, provided there have been at work concerned men and
women who have developed a position on which the legislative body can quickly
take a stand when disaster confronts it. '213 Unfortunately, Senator Hart may have
been too sanguine in assuming that preexisting legislation is a prerequisite to action
in the wake of highly publicized negative events. The foregoing discussion shows
that while some crises, including the 1962 Amendments, serve as the catalyst for the
passage of legislation already working its way through Congress, others produce
legislation crafted from whole cloth in a short time frame.
There is no better way to sum up the questions posed by this article than by
quoting the response of Senator Douglas to the passage of the 1962 Amendments.
"Can we learn from this lesson," Senator Douglas wondered aloud, "or can mankind
educate itself only by disaster and tragedy? 2 14 Irrespective of the ultimate answer
to Senator Douglas' query, food and drug legislation continues to embody a rich
field for study, providing valuable data about the nature of public responses to risk
and about the legislative process.
212 PAUL R. ERLICH & ANNE ERLICH, EXTINCTION: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISAP-
PEARANCE OF SPECIES (1981).
213 108 Cong. Rec. 22,043 (1962) (statement of Sen. Hart), reprinted in 23 FDA, A LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT AND ITS AMENDMENTS, at 194 (1979). 1 am grateful to
Harvard Law Student Julie A. Grow for locating this quotation in her 1997 paper, The Legislative History of
the 1962 Drug Amendments: A Failure to Forget or a Lesson to Learn From? (May 1, 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/I189/jgrow.rtf).
214 RICHARD HARRIS, THE REAL VOICE 215 (1964) (citing HARVEY TEFF & COLIN R. MUNRO, THA-
LIDOMIDE: THE LEGAL AFTERMATH 1 11 (1976)).
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